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HOW ON EARTH CAN YOU POSSIBLY
“FILE” AN ORAL COMPLAINT?:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE BOUNDARIES OF
§ 215(A)(3) OF THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT
SCOTT C. ROSS†
INTRODUCTION
The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or the “Act”) requires
most employers to pay minimum wages and overtime to
employees working more than forty hours per week.1 To protect
employees from retaliation by their employer if they “file any
complaint” with regard to FLSA-related issues, Congress enacted
§ 215(a)(3).2 Despite the seemingly plain and clear meaning of
the phrase “filed any complaint,” courts are split over how to
interpret this language. Specifically, the courts of appeals are
divided on the question of whether § 215(a)(3) protects employees
who make informal oral complaints⎯for example, oral
complaints made at work to a supervisor.3 The strict view is that
the plain language of this provision limits the causes of action.4
†
Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St.
John’s University School of Law; B.S., 2005, Pennsylvania State University.
1
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 206, 207, 212 (West 2011).
2
Section 215(a)(3) provides that “it shall be unlawful for any person to
discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such
employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding . . . or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding.” Id.
§ 215(a)(3).
3
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: 2009 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 950–51
(Amy P. Maloney et al. eds., Supp. 2009). Throughout this Note, a “formal”
complaint, written or verbal, implies that the complaint was externally made to a
regulatory agency, such as the Department of Labor. An “informal” complaint,
written or verbal, refers to a complaint internally made in the workplace.
4
See Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Kasten v.
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting
that an expansive interpretation of § 215(a)(3) may be warranted because of the
remedial nature of the FLSA, but “reading words out of a statute” is something else),
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834).
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The broad interpretation protects oral complaints because
§ 215(a)(3) was meant to address employee fears of retaliation for
raising complaints.5
As the split between the circuits grows and the number of
retaliatory complaints increases,6 resolution of the inter-circuit
dispute becomes increasingly important.7 While the goal of the
FLSA is to protect employees, an interpretation of § 215(a)(3)
that protects any oral complaint made in the workplace—
informal oral complaints—would put employers at a
disadvantage.
First, the FLSA is already deferential to
employees. But if an expansive approach is adopted, the
employer will have to disprove that the employee verbally
complained, a much more difficult task than if the employee had
to follow a more formal procedure, particularly during discovery.8
Second, protecting oral complaints opens the courts up to
frivolous lawsuits where an employee “manufacture[s] a
retaliation claim” after being fired.9 Third, as a result of
frivolous lawsuits, employers will be subject to significant

5
See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). These
circuits emphasize that employer compliance with the provisions of the FLSA is
without federal oversight and is maintained by a system in which employees should
be free to voice grievances without the fear of economic retaliation. See Mitchell v.
Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
6
Since 1997, the number of retaliatory charges brought to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has steadily increased, from
18,198, which was 22.6% of all complaints in 1997, to 22,768, which was 27.0% of all
EEOC complaints in 2002, to 33,613, which was 36.0% of all EEOC complaints in
2009. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS FY
1997 THROUGH FY 2010, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement
/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). While these statistics cover the retaliatory
charges of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Equal Pay Act,
“[s]uch a dramatic increase in retaliation charges arguably is not confined [just to
those statutes], but extends to the FLSA as well.” Jennifer Lynne Redmond, Are You
Breaking Some Sort of Law?: Protecting an Employee’s Informal Complaints Under
the Fair Labor Standards Act’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
319, 319 n.1 (2000).
7
“As the number of retaliation charges continues to increase, it becomes more
important to understand the statutory provisions governing retaliation so that they
may be applied consistently.” Redmond, supra note 6, at 319–20.
8
See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 31–34 and
accompanying text (discussing the burden-shifting scheme).
9
See Kelly v. City of Mount Vernon, 344 F. Supp. 2d 395, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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penalties if the employee is successful.10 An employer may even
be forced to settle with an undeserving employee so as to avoid
litigation costs and potential liability.
This Note argues that it is necessary to find a balance
between the liberal and strict approaches when interpreting the
anti-retaliatory provision of the FLSA. Part I of this Note
provides background on the FLSA, its retaliatory provision, and a
proposed amendment to the retaliatory provision currently before
the Senate and House of Representatives. Part II addresses the
various arguments the courts of appeals consider to arrive at
their conclusion on how to interpret § 215(a)(3), including abiding
by the plain language, examining the purpose of the Act, and
comparing it to similar anti-retaliation provisions. Though the
language is unambiguous, Part III argues that the policy and
purpose of § 215(a)(3) requires courts to look past its clear
language. However, this Note concludes that it would be
improper for courts to protect informally made oral complaints
from retaliation. As a matter of best practice, an employee
should be required to put his complaint in writing in order to be
covered by § 215(a)(3).11
I.

THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE FLSA AND ITS
RETALIATORY PROVISION

The history and background of the FLSA is important to
understand before examining its retaliation scheme.
This
background understanding describes what Congress did, and did
not, intend when creating § 215(a)(3). In addition, while the
anti-retaliation provision has not changed for seventy-two years,
there are proposed amendments to § 215(a)(3) currently pending
before the Senate and House of Representatives.12

10
Employers who violate § 215(a)(3) may have to reinstate or promote the
injured employee. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2011).
11
See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 839
(7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834).
12
See Fair Pay Act, S. 904, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009); Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R.
11, 111th Cong. § 203 (2009).
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The FLSA Was Enacted as a Means of Protecting Employees

The FLSA was passed by Congress and signed by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt on June 25, 1938 in the heart of the Great
Depression.13 President Roosevelt declared that it was perhaps
“the most far-reaching, . . . far-sighted program for the benefit of
workers ever adopted.”14 The central aim of the act was to
achieve certain minimum labor standards.15 The Supreme Court
has stated that the “remedial and humanitarian” provisions of
the FLSA as a whole are not to be applied in a “narrow, grudging
manner.”16 Despite numerous amendments to the Act and
periodic technical corrections because of changing judicial
interpretations, the basic framework of the Act has remained
intact. While there have been periodic technical corrections to
the Act because of changing judicial interpretations, as well as
numerous amendments to it, its basic framework has not
changed.17
The FLSA has established itself as a law that serves
fundamental national interests by providing a greater quality of
life for employees.18 Individual employees19 are covered under
the FLSA but not white collar employees.20 Employers are

13

See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 2, 15 (Ellen C. Kearns et al. eds., 1999).
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address of the President Delivered by Radio
from the White House (June 24, 1938), available at http://www.mhrcc.org/fdr/
chat13.html.
15
See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
16
See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597
(1944). The courts that argue for a broad enough interpretation of § 215(a)(3) so as to
protect verbal complaints from employer retaliation often use this Supreme Court
quote as a basis for their position. See, e.g., Lambert v. Ackerly, 180 F.3d 997, 1003
(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
17
See generally THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 15–36. The
most notable amendment was the 1963 addition of the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”). See
id. at 27.
18
Id. at 3.
19
This is the traditional manner in which employees are covered only if they are
“engaged in commerce” or in “production of goods for commerce.” Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 206(a), 207(a) (West 2011). For example, an
autoworker at a car parts manufacturer would be covered by § 215(a)(3). See, e.g., 1
MARK ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 627–28 (4th ed. 2009).
20
See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006). This includes the general class of executive,
administrative, and professional employees. See id. There are several other exempt
groups of individuals. See generally id. § 213(a)(3), (5)–(8), (10), (12), (15)–(17).
However, white collar employees are not exempt under the EPA. See REBECCA
HANNER WHITE, EMPLOYMENT LAW AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: ESSENTIAL
TERMS AND CONCEPTS 168 (1998).
14
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required to pay these employees minimum wages21 and
overtime22 and to avoid the use of oppressive child labor.23 In
1963, the FLSA was amended when the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”)
was added to prohibit employers from providing disparate
salaries to employees based on their sex when the work is
equal.24
The U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) is empowered by
Congress to enforce the various provisions of the FLSA.25
However, there is no requirement to exhaust administrative
remedies before bringing a FLSA claim before a court.26
B.

The FLSA Prohibits Retaliation Against Employees Who
“File any Complaint”

It is not unusual for an anti-discrimination statute to contain
an anti-retaliation provision, as these provisions ensure that
employees are protected when they assert their rights under that
statute.27 Section 215(a)(3) of the FLSA provides that it shall be
unlawful for “any person” to engage in retaliatory conduct.28 This
person may not “discharge or in any other manner discriminate29
against any employee because such employee has filed any
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any

21

See 29 U.S.C.A. § 206.
See id. § 207.
23
See 29 U.S.C. § 212.
24
See generally 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 206–09; see also THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
ACT, supra note 13, at 27.
25
See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 40. However, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is charged with enforcement of the
EPA. See WHITE, supra note 20, at 167. There is no requirement under any portion
of the FLSA to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an FLSA claim
before a court.
26
See WHITE, supra note 20, at 167–68.
27
See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 867.
28
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). The definition of “any person” who, under this Act, may
not engage in retaliatory conduct includes “an individual, partnership, association,
corporation, business trust, legal representative, or any organized group of persons.”
Id. § 203(a).
29
“The most common retaliatory act is discharge.” THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
ACT, supra note 13, at 896. Discriminatory acts include on-the-job harassment, wage
reductions, and post-discharge blacklisting or disparagement. See Cartwright v.
Tacala, Inc., No. CIV A 99-W-663-N, 2000 WL 33287445, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 1,
2000); Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1180,
1185 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
22
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proceeding . . . or has testified or is about to testify in any such
proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry
committee.”30
To prove a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected conduct under
§ 215(a)(3); (2) he suffered some adverse employment action; and
(3) there is a “causal link . . . between the plaintiff’s conduct and
the employment action.”31 Once the plaintiff has made a prima
facie showing of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive.32 To defeat
the employer’s showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for discharge, the employee must show that the employer’s
reason was a pretext for retaliation.33 If an employee can prove
that the employer was partially motivated by the employee’s
protected conduct, the employee will prevail.34
An employer’s violation of § 215(a)(3) may entitle the
employee to damages and equitable relief.35 Such relief includes,
but is not limited to, employment, reinstatement, promotion, and
the payment of wages lost.36 Reinstatement is generally the
preferred remedy, unless there are compelling reasons why the
employment relationship cannot continue.37

30

29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 910. The plaintiff can
establish causation by showing that the protected activity preceded the adverse
action and that the employer was aware of the plaintiff’s protected activity before
taking the adverse action. See id. at 912.
32
See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: 2009 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 3, at 987. Legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for discharge have included
excessive lateness in violation of company policy, see Cross v. Bally’s Health &
Tennis Corp., 945 F. Supp. 883, 889 (D. Md. 1996), unacceptable job performance,
see Chyma v. Trackers, Inc., No. 2-293/91-1266, 1992 WL 464328 (Iowa Ct. App.
Nov. 30, 1992), and violating a company policy that prohibits accepting gifts from
vendors and lying to company officials charged with investigating the inciden, see
Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1393 (10th Cir. 1997).
33
See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: 2009 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 3, at 987.
34
See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 915.
35
29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2011).
36
Id. In fact, several circuits award compensatory, punitive, and emotional
distress damages. See Lai v. Eastpoint Int’l, Inc., No. 99 CIV 2095, 2002 WL 265148,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (observing that the Seventh and Ninth Circuits “have
interpreted the relief to include compensatory, punitive, and emotional distress
damages,” but the Second is silent on the issue).
37
See Goldberg v. Bama Mfg. Corp., 302 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1962).
31
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Federal oversight to ensure cooperation with the FLSA has
taken a back seat to a self-regulatory system, whereby the
government relies on receiving complaints from employees rather
than supervising employers itself.38 The idea is that effective
enforcement can only be expected if employees feel free to
approach officials with their grievances.39 If retaliation were
permitted to go unremedied, it would have a “chilling effect upon
the willingness of individuals to speak out against employment
discrimination.”40 This would cause employees to fear being
retaliated against, resulting in aggrieved employees quietly
accepting substandard conditions.41
C.

Proposed Legislation To Amend the Anti-Retaliation
Provision of the FLSA

For seventy-two years, the wording of § 215(a)(3) has
remained unchanged.42 However, a proposed amendment to
§ 215(a) has recently been approved by the House of
Representatives,43 and a different version of the proposed
amendment is currently sitting unresolved before the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.44 The
version approved by the House of Representatives strikes the
language of § 215(a)(3) and replaces it with language that
protects employees from retaliation if they made a “charge or
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
investigation . . . or ha[d] testified or is planning to testify . . . or
ha[d] inquired about, discussed or disclosed the wages of the
employee or another employee.”45 Thus, an employee would be
entitled to protection from retaliation whenever he discusses
wages, formally or informally, with his employer.

38
See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (“For
weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not seek to secure compliance
with prescribed standards through continuing detailed federal supervision or
inspection of payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on information and complaints received
from employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied.”).
39
See id.
40
See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 8-I (1998), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
policy/docs/retal.html.
41
See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292.
42
See generally THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 15–36.
43
See Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 11, 111th Cong. § 203(b) (2009).
44
See Fair Pay Act of 2009, S. 904, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009).
45
H.R. 11, § 203(b).
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The proposed legislation sitting before the Senate
Subcommittee also carves out an exception to § 215(a)(3) but is
very different than the version approved by the House of
Representatives. This version first adds a new category of
protected activity, § 6(h), which is an extension of the Equal Pay
Act, whereby an employer may not discriminate against
employees “on the basis of sex, race, or national origin by paying
[lower] wages.”46 Further, without striking § 215(a)(3), the
proposed legislation states that an employer may not
“discriminate against any individual because such individual has
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [§] 6(h).”47 It goes
on to state that an employer may not retaliate against any
“employee [who has] inquired about . . . [his] wages or the wages
of any other employee, or because the employee exercised . . . any
right granted or protected by [§] 6(h).”48 Therefore, under the
proposed legislation, any complaint about wages or wage
discrimination would fall under this much broader language, but
the “filed any complaint” language would still apply to grievances
about other statutorily enumerated issues, such as child labor or
overtime hours.
II. THERE IS NO INTER-CIRCUIT UNIFORMITY IN THE
INTERPRETATION OF § 215(A)(3)
Federal courts are divided as to whether § 215(a)(3) should
protect employees who make informal verbal complaints to their
employer from retaliation. A broad reading of the statute accepts
all sorts of oral complaints as being “filed,” whereas a strict
reading tends to limit complaints “filed” to informally made
written grievances or formally lodged ones.
As a result of this circuit split, similarly situated employees
are being treated differently depending on their jurisdiction. An
employee in a circuit that broadly construes § 215(a)(3) is
completely protected from retaliation if he makes an oral
complaint to his supervisor. However, in a circuit that strictly
46
S. 904, § 3. However, unlike the Equal Pay Act, this only applies to jobs that
are “dominated by employees of a particular sex, race, or national origin” where
employees are paid “at a rate less than the rate at which the employer pays wages to
employees in such establishment in another job that is dominated by employees of
the opposite sex or of a different race or national origin, respectively, for work on
equivalent jobs.” Id.
47
Id. § 4.
48
Id.
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construes § 215(a)(3), this same employee would not be protected
and could very well be unemployed as a result. Without clarity,
this varying treatment frustrates the overall purpose of the
FLSA, which is to ensure that all employees obtain a decent
standard of living.49
The courts of appeals rely on several different arguments to
determine the degree of protection afforded to employees under
§ 215(a)(3). In general, the courts balance the language of
§ 215(a)(3) against the policy governing its enforcement.50 They
sometimes supplement these arguments with comparisons to
similar retaliation provisions to justify their interpretation.51
A.

Arguments on Whether “Filed any Complaint” Is Ambiguous

Because the legislative history of § 215(a)(3) does not clearly
express a legislative intent as to the statute’s scope,52 courts that
are charged with interpreting § 215(a)(3) begin by simply
examining what the plain meaning of the text suggests.53
Some courts find that despite the “remedial lens” that the
FLSA should be read through,54 the unambiguous language of
§ 215(a)(3) does not allow for the protection of oral complaints.55
For example, in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
Corp., the Seventh Circuit found that an employee who was
terminated after verbally complaining to his supervisor about
billable time at work was not protected under § 215(a)(3).56 The
court concluded that while § 215(a)(3) should be given an
expansive reading, it still requires an employee to “submit some
sort of writing” because it is impossible to “ ‘file’ an oral
complaint.”57
Similarly, in Bartis v. John Bommarito
49

See Daniel v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 57, 59 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834,
839–40 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834).
51
See, e.g., id. at 840.
52
See Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 42 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting
that the legislative history of the FLSA provides no guidance as to the intended
scope of § 215(a)(3)).
53
See Kasten, 570 F.3d at 837–38 (“[A]bsent a clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”
(quoting Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 1999))).
54
See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
55
See Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000).
56
See Kasten, 570 F.3d at 836.
57
Id. at 838, 840. The court did, however, leave open the possibility that
informal written documents could be protected. See id.
50

CP_Ross (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:12 PM

1552

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1543

Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc.,58 a district court within the Eighth
Circuit found that an employee who was fired after he verbally
complained to his boss about a new timesheet policy was not
entitled to § 215(a)(3) protection.59 While the court stated that
there was some room for a broad interpretation, it concluded that
“the statute cannot be construed so broadly as to depart from its
plain and clear language” by protecting oral complaints.60 As
such, these courts generally require a more “verifiable activity”
than an oral complaint.61
Some courts will not even look past the language of the
statute because Congress’s obvious intent is evident in its plain
language.62 For example, in Lambert v. Genesee Hospital,63 the
Second Circuit held that a female employee who verbally
complained to her supervisor about a wage disparity between
herself and a similarly situated male employee was not entitled
to § 215(a)(3) protection.64 The court limited the causes of action
in a § 215(a)(3) case to three enumerated types of conduct: filing
a formal complaint with the Department of Labor, instituting a
proceeding, or testifying.65 Since the intent of Congress was clear
according to this court, there was no need to look beyond the
language of the statute.66 As a result, district courts within the
Second Circuit have eliminated all informal workplace
complaints from the scope of protection afforded by § 215(a)(3).67
58

626 F. Supp. 2d 994 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
See id. at 997, 1001.
60
Id. at 999.
61
Clevinger v. Motel Sleepers, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 322, 324 (W.D. Va. 1999).
62
See Redmond, supra note 6, at 334 (citing HERMAN A. WECHT, WAGE-HOUR
LAW: COVERAGE 29 (1951)).
63
10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993).
64
See id. at 50–52, 56.
65
See id. at 55 (citing EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 990 (6th Cir.
1992) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Not only does
this interpretation not protect informal oral complaints, it does not protect a written
memorandum given to a supervisor. See Kelly v. City of Mount Vernon, 344 F. Supp.
2d 395, 405–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
66
See Lambert, 10 F.3d at 55. The Lambert Court concluded that there was no
need to defer to the opinion stated in the EEOC Compliance Manual, which states
that FLSA retaliation protection should “encompass informal workplace complaints”
since the “intent of Congress [was] clear, that [was] the end of the matter.” Id.
(quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984)).
67
See Kelly, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 405–06 (holding that a written complaint to a
supervisor was not protected from employer retaliation since it was not formally
made to the DOL).
59
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The courts that argue for a broad interpretation of
§ 215(a)(3) generally find that its language is somewhat vague,
leaving open the possibility that certain types of oral complaints
may trigger FLSA protection. For example, after using a
dictionary to interpret the phrase “filed any complaint,” the First
Circuit concluded that an employee who sent a letter to her
supervisor stating that she was entitled to overtime pay was
protected from retaliation by § 215(a)(3).68 The court concluded
that its language was sufficiently ambiguous to protect most
informally made complaints.69 However, the court stated that
“not all abstract grumblings will suffice to constitute the filing of
a complaint with one’s employer”70 and advised all courts within
the circuit to determine an employee’s protection under
§ 215(a)(3) on a case-by-case basis.71 Courts in the Ninth Circuit
apply a similar rule, in that “not all amorphous expressions of
discontent related to wages and hours constitute complaints filed
within the meaning of § 215(a)(3).”72 It just needs to be clear that
the “employee communicates [orally or written] the substance of
his allegations to the employer.”73 Some courts apply an even
broader standard and read § 215(a)(3) to protect any claim under
the Act. For example, the Sixth Circuit held that a school
custodian who verbally told her supervisor that the school was
“breaking some sort of law” by not paying male and female
employees equally was a sufficient assertion of her statutory
rights.74 The court came to this conclusion without imposing any
of the qualifications discussed in Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc.

68

Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 45 (1st Cir. 1999).
See id. at 41–42. The court determined that by using the word “any” in the
phrase “filed any complaint,” Congress left open the possibility that it could relate to
less formal expressions. Id. at 42. Similarly, the court found that if the phrase “filed
any complaint” was limited to formally filed complaints, the additional language, “or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding,” becomes superfluous. Id.
70
Id. at 44. Requiring more than “abstract grumblings” is important because
“[w]ork places are rarely idyllic retreats, and the mere fact that an employee is
displeased by an employer’s act or omission does not elevate that act or omission to
the level of a materially adverse employment action.” Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716,
725 (1st Cir. 1996).
71
See Valerio, 173 F.3d at 45.
72
Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1007 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
73
Id. at 1008.
74
EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 989–90 (6th Cir. 1992) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
69
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Analyzing the Purpose of the FLSA To Clarify any
Remaining Ambiguity

After reading the language of § 215(a)(3), courts look to the
purpose of the Act to determine whether to protect informal
complaints. The courts that broadly interpret § 215(a)(3) harp on
the Supreme Court’s view that the FLSA has “remedial and
humanitarian”75 purposes to ensure that “all employees may
obtain a decent standard of living.”76 Congress chose to rely on
employees to secure their rights under the statute by voicing
their grievances without the fear of retaliation that may, without
federal oversight, induce aggrieved employees to quietly accept
substandard conditions.77 These courts argue that a broad
interpretation of § 215(a)(3) will promote this “animating spirit”
by prohibiting employer intimidation.78 Therefore, the broad
view suggests that a construction of § 215(a)(3) that protects only
formally made complaints “would do violence to the statute’s
goals.”79
In contrast, some courts of appeals will not even look beyond
the language of the statute to the policy governing the Act.80
These courts find that the plain language of § 215(a)(3) is
“paramount to any purpose, remedial or otherwise.”81 That said,
other courts applying a strict interpretation of § 215(a)(3)
consider the purpose of the Act as a factor in their
75
Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597
(1944) (stating that the “remedial and humanitarian” provisions of the Act are, in
general, not to be applied in a “narrow, grudging manner”).
76
Daniel v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 57, 59 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
77
See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960); Brock
v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124 (3d Cir. 1987). “For weighty practical and other
reasons, Congress did not seek to secure compliance with prescribed standards
through continuing detailed federal supervision or inspection of payrolls. Rather
[Congress relies] on information and complaints received from employees seeking to
vindicate rights claimed to have been denied. . . . [E]ffective enforcement could thus
only be expected if employees [feel] free to approach officials with their
grievances. . . . Congress sought to foster a climate in which compliance with the
substantive provisions of the Act would be enhanced.” Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292.
78
Brock, 812 F.2d at 124.
79
Daniel, 611 F. Supp. at 59.
80
“[W]here Congress has made the public policy decision and expressed it
clearly, as in § 215(a)(3)’s plain and unambiguous language, it is not open to courts
to trump or change this decision in the name of statutory interpretation” to reach,
what the court deems, a more sensible result. O’Neill v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956
F. Supp. 661, 664 n.6 (E.D. Va. 1997).
81
Jennifer Clemons, FLSA Retaliation: A Continuum of Employee Protection, 53
BAYLOR L. REV. 535, 553 (2001).
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determination.82 For example, the Seventh Circuit recognizes
that the remedial nature of § 215(a)(3) warrants an expansive
interpretation but not a reading so expansive as to protect oral
complaints.83
C.

Comparisons Between § 215(a)(3) and Other Anti-Retaliation
Provisions

Many courts find helpful analogies from similar antiretaliatory provisions to either support or reject an argument
that the anti-retaliatory provision of the FLSA protects
informally made oral complaints.84 In general, courts look at the
anti-retaliation provisions of the Age Discrimination and
Employment Act (“ADEA”),85 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (“Title VII”),86 and the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”).87
Courts that strictly interpret § 215(a)(3) distinguish the Act
with the anti-retaliation language of the ADEA, which was
originally enacted by Congress as part of the FLSA.88 The ADEA
“forbid[s] employers from retaliating against any employee who
‘has opposed any practice’ that is unlawful under the statutes.”89
The Seventh Circuit found it “significant” that Congress chose
the narrower phrase “filed any complaint” when enacting
§ 215(a)(3) of the FLSA.90 By finding that the “cause of action for
82

See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840
(7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834).
84
Compare Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) (contrasting
the broadly construed Title VII retaliation provision with § 215(a)(3)), with Lambert
v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (relying on courts that
compared nonretaliatory policies of other statutes to establish that a broad
interpretation of § 215(a)(3) was proper).
85
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621–34 (West 2011).
86
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
87
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006).
88
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621–34). Therefore, “much of the
extensive ADEA jurisprudence is directly relevant to FLSA questions.” THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 27. In 1979, all aspects of the
administration of the ADEA were transferred over to the EEOC. See 29 U.S.C. § 625;
29 U.S.C.A. § 626(a)–(b); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 209, 211.
89
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th
Cir. 2009) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09834). This prohibition has been interpreted to protect verbal complaints. See Kotcher
v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1992).
90
Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840.
83
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retaliation under the FLSA is much more circumscribed”91 than
under the ADEA, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a strict
interpretation of the phrase “filed any complaint” is proper
because “Congress could have, but did not, use broader language
in the FLSA’s retaliation provision.”92
Both the strict and the broad groups compare and contrast
the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII to § 215(a)(3). Title VII
protects employees who “oppose[ ] any practice made an unlawful
employment practice.”93 This retaliation provision encompasses
any method of complaint, formal or informal, that could
reasonably be interpreted by the employer as opposition to
discrimination.94
The strict camp distinguishes the language of § 215(a)(3)
from the language of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII.
For example, a district court decided that “oppose any practice” is
far broader than the protection found in the narrow limitations of
the FLSA.95 This broad “opposition clause” brings informal
protests and oral complaints within the ambit of protected
activity.96 Therefore, the court concluded that the scope of the
FLSA anti-retaliation provision is much more limited and “does
not extend to activities that fall outside its clear text.”97 In
addition, the Fourth Circuit found that the anti-retaliation
language of the FLSA is “much more circumscribed” than the

91

Id. (quoting Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000)).
Id.
93
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). Title VII prohibits
discrimination of an employee because of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Id. § 2000e-2.
94
See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 40, § 8-II(B)(2), (3)(b); see also Redmond,
supra note 6, at 343. The EEOC maintains that the theory behind the Title VII
retaliation scheme is that “Title VII’s protections against workplace discrimination
mean little if retaliation discourages people from filing charges in the first place.”
Marilee L. Miller, The Employer Strikes Back: The Case for a Broad Reading of Title
VII’s Bar on Retaliation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 505, 520.
95
See Bartis v. John Bommarito Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 994,
999 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
96
See Jackson v. Advantage Commc’ns, Inc., No. 4:08CV00353 SWW, 2009 WL
2508210, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 14, 2009). Given the similarities between the
proposed amendment of § 215(a)(3) pending before the Senate and the ADEA and
Title VII anti-retaliation provisions, oral complaints related to wage discrimination
would be protected activity under the new FLSA provision, if enacted. See supra
notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
97
Bartis, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 1000.
92
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anti-retaliation language of Title VII.98 While the court did not
condone retaliatory conduct, all it could feasibly do was invite
Congress to change the language of § 215(a)(3) to be more like
the nonretaliatory language of Title VII.99
On the other hand, the broad camp gives no credence to the
comparison between the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII
and that of the FLSA. This group argues that the FLSA was
written seventy-two years ago, when statutes were far less
detailed and written simpler.100 It goes on to conclude, “[t]he fact
that Congress decided to include a more detailed anti-retaliation
provision more than a generation later, when it drafted Title VII,
tells us little about what Congress meant at the time it drafted
the comparable provision of the FLSA.”101
Some courts also compare the anti-retaliation provision of
the NLRA to § 215(a)(3). The NLRA makes it unlawful to
“discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee
because he has filed charges or given testimony under this
subchapter.”102 The Supreme Court has found that given the
policy and objective of the NLRA to protect employees from
employer intimidation, there is enough ambiguity in the
language of the provision to afford broader protection to the
employee.103 Proponents of the broad interpretation generally
98
Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000); see also
Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing EEOC v. Romeo
Cmty. Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 1992) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)) (noting that § 215(a)(3) on its face prohibits retaliation
based on “three expressly enumerated types of conduct,” in contrast to the much
broader retaliation wording in Title VII).
99
See Ball, 228 F.3d at 364–65. The court stated that if the employer did
retaliate against the employee, it “would provide an example of why Congress found
it necessary in other contexts to enact broader anti-retaliation provisions. . . . But
this moral judgment does not justify a conclusion—contrary to the plain language of
the FLSA . . . .” Id. at 365. Congress is currently considering whether to accept that
invitation to amend § 215(a)(3) to be more like Title VII or the ADEA. See supra
notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
100
See Lambert v. Ackerly, 180 F.3d 997, 1005 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
101
Id.
102
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2006). The NLRA
protects employees’ right to form, join, or assist labor unions; to bargain collectively
with their employers; and to engage in other forms of concerted activity. See id.
§ 157.
103
NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972) (noting that “the presence of the
preceding words ‘to discharge or otherwise discriminate’ reveals . . . particularly by
the word ‘otherwise,’ an intent on the part of Congress to afford broad rather than
narrow protection”). However, this case only answered the question of whether a
sworn written statement to a field examiner constituted a protected activity and did
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conclude that the language of the anti-retaliation provision of the
NLRA is just as inclusive.104 Therefore, when applying the broad
construction of the anti-retaliation provision of the NLRA to
§ 215(a)(3), one court found that an employee’s oral and written
complaints to her supervisor entitled her to protection under the
Act.105
III. ANALYZING THE LANGUAGE, PURPOSE, AND POLICY OF
§ 215(A)(3)
Although the similar retaliation provisions do not provide
significant guidance on how to interpret § 215(a)(3), the balance
between the plain language of § 215(a)(3), its purpose, and the
potential costs if informal oral complaints were to be protected
weighs in favor of a construction of § 215(a)(3) that does not
protect verbal complaints. Requiring an employee to put his
complaint in writing, whether formally made to a government
agency or informally made to an employer, furthers the purposes
of § 215(a)(3).
A.

There Is Limited Guidance Provided by the Similar AntiRetaliation Provisions

Of the three retaliation provisions discussed, only the ADEA
should guide the courts on how to interpret § 215(a)(3). Although
the ADEA was originally enacted as part of the FLSA, Congress
chose to write its anti-retaliation provision in a much less
“circumscribed” fashion.106 Because “a judge must presume that
Congress chose its words with as much care as the judge himself
brings to bear on the task of statutory interpretation,”107 it
cannot be presumed that Congress intended “filed any complaint”
and “opposed any practice” to be interpreted the same way. This
suggests that § 215(a)(3), unlike the ADEA, does not protect oral
complaints.

not address the question of whether informal verbal complaints were covered within
the scope of the NLRA. Id. at 121.
104
See Daniel v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 57, 60 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
105
See id. at 63.
106
See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840
(7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir.
2009)), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834).
107
See FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 635 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Scholars have argued that the policies shaping the EEOC
Compliance Manual’s broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII should apply equally to § 215(a)(3).108
However, there is no need for the FLSA to defer to EEOC
interpretations. The reasons that the EEOC policies are not
compelling are numerous. First, courts generally do not defer to
the EEOC view of what constitutes an adverse employment
action because many believe that the EEOC lacks substantive
rulemaking authority under Title VII.109 Second, the Department
of Labor has sole administrative control over the FLSA, not the
EEOC.110 Third, the EEOC, in its Compliance Manual, bases its
broad interpretation merely on its reading of judicial precedent,
as opposed to the agency’s own interpretation; therefore, its
statements are not binding on courts.111 Thus, Title VII provides
no guidance on how to interpret § 215(a)(3) of the FLSA.
Similarly, although the Supreme Court adopted a liberal
construction of the NLRA anti-retaliation provision, the Court
did so only with regard to the question of whether sworn written
statements were within the scope of protected activity.112 The
Court never suggested that oral complaints made to the employer

108

See, e.g., Redmond, supra note 6, at 339–40.
Miller, supra note 94, at 523. Courts must afford high levels of deference to
agencies’ interpretations “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984). However, as the Court emphasized in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., “a high
degree of deference is simply not appropriate in all cases.” Miller, supra note 94, at
524 (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). “[A]n agency’s opinion is rewarded with high
deference only when the agency provided for formal procedures⎯including notice
and comment or formal adjudication⎯in forming those opinions.” Id. (citing United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001)). Therefore the EEOC’s authority in
regard to interpretations of substantive issues is not very clear. See id. at 525; see
also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 111 n.6 (2002) (“The
EEOC’s interpretive guidelines do not receive Chevron deference. . . . Such
interpretations are ‘entitled to respect’ . . . but only to the extent that those
interpretations have the ‘power to persuade.’ ” (internal citations omitted)).
110
See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 40. The Department
of Labor has not issued its opinion on the meaning of “filed any complaint” within
§ 215(a)(3) of the FLSA.
111
See Hodgson & Sons, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 49 F.3d 822,
826 (1st Cir. 1995).
112
See NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 125 (1972).
109

CP_Ross (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:12 PM

1560

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1543

were protected activity.113
Therefore, the anti-retaliation
provision of the NLRA should not provide guidance to courts in
their analysis of § 215(a)(3).
B.

A Plain Reading of § 215(a)(3)

Courts, in construing the language of a statute, are
instructed to begin with “the language of the statute itself.”114
“Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,
that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”115
Because there is no legislative history on point, the language of
§ 215(a)(3) is where to begin the analysis.116
By “giving effect to the normal, everyday usage of the
words”of the statute, § 215(a)(3) excludes oral complaints from
protection.117 Combining “filed” with “any complaint” does not
create a phrase that is “susceptible to many different
interpretations” when it comes to protecting oral complaints.118
For example, the First Circuit used a dictionary to define
“complaint” but concluded that the definition was ambiguous.119
However, while the definition of complaint includes “the act or
action of expressing protest, censure, or resentment: expression
of injustice,”120 all of which may be done informally, Congress put
the word “filed,” a verb, before “any complaint” for a reason.
“Filed,” when used as a verb, means “[t]o deliver (a paper or
instrument) to the proper officer so that it is received by him to

113
114

See id.
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108

(1980).
115

Id.
Cf. Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 45 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting
that the legislative history of the FLSA provides no guidance as to the intended
scope of § 215(a)(3)).
117
See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 482 (1990) (“If the statute is clear and
unambiguous that is the end of the matter, for the court . . . must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress[,] . . . [that is,] the plain meaning of
the statute . . . .” (quoting K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291–92 (1988))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
118
Redmond, supra note 6, at 332.
119
See Valerio, 173 F.3d at 41. The court found that “[b]y failing to specify that
the filing of any complaint need to be with a court or an agency, and by using the
word ‘any,’ Congress left open the possibility that it intended ‘complaint’ to relate to
less formal expressions of protest, censure, resentment, or injustice conveyed to an
employer.” Id.
120
Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 464 (1971)).
116
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[be] kept on file, or among the records of his office.”121 Thus,
“filed” formalizes the procedure of making a complaint. One
court asserts that congressional intent is unclear because the use
of the word “any” creates the possibility that Congress intended
the provision to apply to any type of complaint, including
informal complaints.122 However, “any complaint” is modified by
“filed.” Therefore, while one may file an expression of protest,
censure, resentment, or injustice in writing, one cannot file said
expression orally.123
Furthermore, if Congress enacts the proposed amendments
to the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, it will demonstrate
its belief that “filed any complaint” should be strictly construed.
By broadening the language of § 215(a)(3) with respect to wagebased complaints,124 but not for other types of FLSA-related
complaints, Congress would be implying that “filed any
complaint” means something different than what is being
proposed. Because opposing or inquiring about wage-related
issues125 would undoubtedly protect informally made oral
complaints, it would render the amendments superfluous if “filed
any complaint” were to be construed in the same way with regard
to non-wage-based issues.126
Moreover, the plain meaning approach to interpreting
§ 215(a)(3) is justified by democratic considerations. Adhering to
the plain meaning of a statute, in general, promotes democratic
values in lawmaking and deference to our representatives since
Congress votes on the language of a bill.127 As one commentator
121
See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 838
(7th Cir. 2009) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 945 (2d ed. 1958)) (emphasis added), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
1890 (2010) (No. 09-834).
122
See id. (citing Valerio, 173 F.3d at 42); Redmond, supra note 6, at 333.
123
Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839.
124
The proposed amendment would generally protect an employee who opposed
or inquired about wage-related issues. See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying
text.
125
See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text (discussing the new possible
language of the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA).
126
When construing a statute, courts should avoid rendering parts of it
superfluous. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112
(1991).
127
See Katherine A. Rocco, Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: In the Interest of Full Disclosure?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2227, 2243 (2008)
(citing Robert S. Summers, Judge Richard Posner’s Jurisprudence, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1302, 1320 (1991) (book review)).
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argues, the plain meaning of language allows citizens to rely on
published law.128 This creates a “zone of certainty” because the
language of the statute means what it says and is thus safe to
rely on.129 Subjecting citizens to a special meaning contrary to
the clear statutory language operates to “jerk the rug from
beneath them.”130 Furthermore, adhering to the clear language
of a statute supports formal equality since the law will be the
same for everyone and applied in the same way.131 Therefore, by
following a plain meaning approach to interpreting § 215(a)(3),
all employees will be treated equally and all employers can rely
on established law in making the business decision to no longer
retain an employee.
C.

The Purpose of the FLSA

Even if the court looks behind the clear and unambiguous
language of § 215(a)(3), the history and purpose of the Act do not
mandate protection for informal verbal complaints. The FLSA is
a remedial statute that was enacted to address long-festering
labor issues culminating in the Great Depression.132 The broad
camp argues that the provision was designed to encourage
employees to report substantive violations without fear of
retalitaion.133
Thus, this group argues that a narrow
construction of the anti-retaliation provision creates an
atmosphere of intimidation and defeats the Act’s goal of
preventing employees’ attempts to secure their rights from being
a “calculated risk.”134

128

See id. (citing Summers, supra note 127, at 1321).
See Ruth Sullivan, Legal Drafting: The Plain Meaning Rule and Other Ways
to Cheat at Statutory Interpretation, http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~resulliv/legdr/pmr
.html#N_1 (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). This emphasis on the text ensures that the law
is certain and that the public has fair notice, both of which are prerequisites for
effective law. See id.
130
Rocco, supra note 127, at 2243 (quoting Summers, supra note 127, at 1321).
131
Sullivan, supra note 129.
132
See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597
(1944).
133
See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)
(“[F]ear of economic retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved employees
quietly to accept substandard conditions.”).
134
See, e.g., Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 43 (1st Cir. 1999)
(quoting Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 293).
129
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While allowing employees to pursue informal internal
remedies benefits both the employee and the employer,135 there
must be limits, given the language of the statute. It is true that
Congress chose, in enacting its remedial statute, to prevent an
environment in which employees choose silence over
unemployment.136 However, this does not mean that Congress
chose to have its carefully designed statute read completely
outside its wording.137 Given the high burden that must be met
to justify interpreting a statute beyond its clear and
unambiguous language, the legislative purpose, while
compelling, does not validate changing the defined meaning of
“filed.”138 Congress made its policy decision in its clear word
choice; therefore, it is not open for courts to trump this
determination in the name of statutory interpretation or for the
purpose of reaching a more sensible result.139
D. Effect on an Employer’s Business
A consideration of the costs imposed on employers if informal
oral complaints are protected shows why they should not come
within the ambit of § 215(a)(3) protection. First, as a result of
universally broad protection, there would be an “increase [in] the
number of retaliation lawsuits filed, thus increasing the amount
of money employers need to devote to defending the claims.”140
This would inevitably lead to a reduction in salaries and
shareholder dividends as litigation expenses would rise.
Alternatively, this increase in expenses could be passed on to
consumers in the form of increased costs.
135
Redmond, supra note 6, at 335 (citing Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v.
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478–79 (3d Cir. 1993)). “A construction of the
statute requiring an employee to file a formal external complaint denies the
employer an opportunity to resolve the situation quietly and promptly.” Id. at 335–
36 (citing Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Herman, 146 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir.
1998)).
136
See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292.
137
It took three congressional hearings and more than a year to get this bill
passed into law. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 14–15.
138
See United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937, 943 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United
States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985)).
139
See O’Neill v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 661, 664 n.6 (E.D. Va.
1997).
140
Redmond, supra note 6, at 338–39 (citing David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the
Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
73, 76–78 (1999)).
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Second, an increase in the number of lawsuits would force
employers to settle claims without regard to the merits of each
case.141 It is easy to imagine a situation in which an employee
who was fired for poor workmanship manufactures a retaliation
claim after the fact by asserting that he was fired for verbally
complaining to his boss.142 Given the deference to the employee
under the remedial provisions of the FLSA, the employer would
have difficulty defending itself because of a lack of compelling
evidence in its favor.143 This unnecessarily puts the burden on
the employer to decide whether it is worthwhile to try to defend
itself in court.144 Requiring an employee to put his complaint in
writing establishes a record that allows the employer to properly
investigate an employee’s claim to determine whether settlement
or litigation should be the next step. Demanding “some sort of a
writing”145 from the employee increases the authority of proof and
puts the employer and employee on equal footing in terms of
discovery and litigation.
Shifting the burden to the employer to file all orally-made
complaints does not put the parties on equal ground. For
example, the First Circuit expects employers to place employee
complaints on file among the employer’s official records.146 While
this would solve the problem of disadvantaging an employer
during litigation since every complaint would be accounted for, it
is an unrealistic expectation. Assuming that all complaints,
whether or not they are related to statutorily-enumerated
protected conduct, will be placed on a company’s official records
puts a substantial burden on supervisors and managers. This
would require the company to prepare a formal memorandum
every time a complaint is raised or would require the company to
add staff dedicated to this process. The end result would be
increased operating costs and either salary cuts or increased
costs to consumers. Putting the light burden on an employee to
141

See Sherwyn, supra note 140, at 81.
See generally Kelly v. City of Mount Vernon, 344 F. Supp. 2d 395, 405–06
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
143
See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 31–34
and accompanying text (discussing the burden-shifting scheme).
144
Settlements are advantageous to an employer since “they eliminate the
uncertainty and cost of protracted litigation.” Pierce v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. Co., 110 F.3d 431, 437 (7th Cir. 1997).
145
See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840
(7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834).
146
See Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 41–42 (1st Cir. 1999).
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write a letter when he or she has a complaint would not frustrate
the purpose of the statute since the employee would still be
protected.147 Further, it encourages the employee to think about
his complaint and consider its merits before giving the employer
a record of it.
E.

Awaiting the Supreme Interpretation

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kasten v. SaintGobain Performance Plastics Corp. to determine whether oral
complaints are protected from retaliation under the FLSA.148
Although there has been no decision rendered yet, it seems likely
from the context of the October 2010 oral argument that a win
for employers is on the horizon.149
Justice Alito, for example, stated that the word “filing”
usually indicates that there is a written document and further
suggested that if an oral complaint is protected from retaliation,
then anybody could claim he or she was retaliated against and
have his or her story corroborated by colleagues, whether true or
not.150 Along the same lines, Justice Sotomayor was concerned
that if an oral complaint comes within the umbrella of filing a
complaint, then an employee at a cocktail party who says
something in passing to his or her boss could make a retaliation
charge if he or she was later fired.151 Similarly, in response to
the plaintiff’s counsel’s claim that he was “filing” a complaint
with the Supreme Court as he was making his oral argument,
Justice Scalia said that such an assertion was “absurd” and that
“people don’t talk like that.”152 Justice Kennedy implied which
way he was leaning when he jokingly stated, “I would like to go
back to the question Justice Scalia filed just earlier,” which was
followed by laughter.153 Justice Roberts also seems to fall on the
side of a strict interpretation, as indicated by his questioning of
147
The proposed amendments to the statute would further reduce the burden on
the employee, since the only time he would have to produce a written document
would be with respect to overtime or hours complaints, not wage-based complaints.
See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
148
Kasten, 130 S. Ct. at 1890.
149
Justice Kagan recused herself from this decision.
150
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, Kasten, 570 F.3d 834 (No. 09-834)
[hereinafter Oral Argument], available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-834.pdf.
151
See id. at 5.
152
Id. at 13.
153
Id.
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how a boss could know whether someone is asserting his or her
statutory rights when the employee makes a verbal complaint.154
Although Justice Thomas did not say anything during oral
argument, he is a noted textualist and will likely fall on the side
of a strict interpretation.155
On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg suggested that the law,
as written, does not mandate that a complaint must be in writing
and that Congress may have had illiterate people and
immigrants in mind when it crafted the FLSA in the 1930s.156
Similarly, Justice Breyer indicated that an oral complaint should
be protected if it were formally made, thus eliminating the
potential for someone filing an oral complaint if made in an
informal environment, such as at a cocktail party or on the
cafeteria line.157
CONCLUSION
The balance between the costs, policy implications, and
statutory construction weighs more heavily in favor of a
interpretation of § 215(a)(3) that does not protect verbal
complaints made in the workplace. It would stand in stark
contrast to the language of § 215(a)(3) to allow oral complaints to
be protected since it is impossible to “ ‘file’ an oral complaint.”158
All other informally made complaints in writing, which can be
“filed” by the employer,159 can be protected without the employee
feeling as if he or she is taking a “calculated risk” by
complaining.160 The proposed construction allows for courts to
interpret the language of § 215(a)(3) through its remedial lens
without throwing the language of § 215(a)(3) by the wayside and
154

Id. at 24.
See, e.g., John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 399, 430 (2010) (noting that Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas are
the “[Supreme] Court’s textualists”).
156
Oral Argument, supra note 150, at 31.
157
See id. at 8.
158
Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834).
159
See generally Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 44–45 (1st Cir.
1999). Anything written includes, but is not limited to, e-mails, text messages,
BBMs, and tweets since these are all “verifiable.” See Clevinger v. Motel Sleepers,
Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 322, 324 (W.D. Va. 1999). Also, under this approach, the
language “instituted any proceeding” would not be rendered superfluous because
filing a written complaint with an employer is not the same as instituting a
proceeding. See Clemons, supra note 81, at 552.
160
See Valerio, 173 F.3d at 43.
155
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without putting the expense and risk completely on the
employer. While some may find that this interpretation could
lead to “morally unacceptable” results, it would be unfaithful to
the clear language of the statute if it were given a more
expansive reading.161 “Congress knows how to afford broad
protection against retaliation when it wants,”162 as evidenced by
its decision to write broader anti-retaliation language in the
ADEA. Should Congress decide to amend § 215(a)(3) with regard
to wage-related issues but not others, it would further show its
intent to construe “file any complaint” narrowly.
A proper construction of § 215(a)(3) takes pieces of the
various arguments for strict and liberal constructions. This
presents an interpretation of § 215(a)(3) that accords with the
language of the statute, without doing “violence”163 to the purpose
of the FLSA. A proper construction of § 215(a)(3) would protect
employees who, in good faith, produce “some sort of writing”164
asserting their statutory rights under FLSA with “substance”165
as long as the assertion is more than an “abstract
grumbling[ ].”166 These requirements ensure that the employee is
serious about his complaint and that there is a record of the
complaint, so as to put the employer and employee on equal
footing in terms of litigation. All indications are that the
Supreme Court is leaning toward a narrow interpretation of
§ 215(a)(3) that will likely comport with the interpretation laid
out in this Note. If Congress wants to afford greater protection to
employees, it should adopt the proposed amendment to the antiretaliation provision of the FLSA.167
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See Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000).
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1000 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
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See Daniel v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 57, 59 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
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Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834).
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